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JUDICIAL MESSAGING: REMOTE TEXTER LIABILITY AS 
PUBLIC EDUCATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an August 2013 case of national first impression, the New Jersey 
Superior Court held that "one who is texting from a location remote 
from the driver of a motor vehicle can be liable to [third parties] 
injured because the driver was distracted by the text.,,1 The remote 
texter will be liable if the accident was caused by texting and if that 
remote texter "knows, or has special reason to know, [that] the 
recipient will view the text while driving" and thus be distracted.3 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kubert fast became the object of ridicule 
among legal commentators and in news coverage. 
Distracted driving is an epidemic that plagues the nation. Polls 
suggest that the current traffic safety culture is one of indifference, 
founded upon drivers' "do as I say, not as I do" attitude.4 At any 
given moment, 660,000 drivers are using cell phones and electronic 
devices while driving.5 Studies show that distracted driving, which 
enhances the risk of a car accident by three times,6 is more dangerous 
than drinking and driving. 7 
1. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214,1218-19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). New Jersey 
motor vehicle and criminal statutes provide penalties for those who use their cell 
phone while driving, but neither statutory nor case law directly address penalties for 
the remote sender of the text. !d. at 1218. 
2. Texter has been recognized in the Collins English Dictionary, defined as "a person 
who communicates by text messaging." Definition of "Texter," COLLINS ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, http://www.collinsdictionary.comldictionarylEnglishitexter (last visited 
Apr. 10,2015). 
3. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1221. 
4. Bruce C. Hamilton et aI., Distracted and Risk-Prone Drivers, AAA FOUND. FOR 
TRAFFIC SAFETY 2 (Jan. 2013), https:llwww.aaafoundation.org/sites/defaultifiles/ 
Distracted%20and%20Risk%20Prone%20Drivers%20FINAL.pdf. 
5. See Timothy M. Pickrell & Tony Jianqiang Ye, Driver Electronic Device Use in 2011, 
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. I (Apr. 2013), http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.govlPubs/811719.pdf. 
6. New VTTl Study Results Continue to Highlight the Dangers of Distracted Driving, 
VA. TECH TRANS. INST. (May 29, 2013), http://www.vtti.vt.eduifeaturedl052913-
cellphone.html. 
7. See Philip LeBeau, Texting and Driving Worse than Drinking and Driving, CNBC 
(June 25, 2009, II :54 AM), http://www.cnbc.comlidl31545004. CNBC and Car and 
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Handling a cell phone while driving is a temptation for people of 
all ages and demographics. As attorneys, we check our email, 
discuss client matters on the phone, and even send and receive 
faxes-all while driving on congested highways or through 
neighborhoods where children play in the streets. We must take a 
step back and reexamine the life in which we consciously and 
unconsciously participate. Today's society is apathetic to the risks 
involved with distracted driving. Public service announcements, peer 
discussion, and even the prospect of a traffic ticket have failed to 
stem this serious hazard. Could the threat of civil liability 
accomplish what all of these conventional approaches to public 
education have not? 
Liability rules do more than compensate the victims of harm for 
their injuries. "When the decisions of the courts become known, and 
defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a 
strong incentive to prevent the occurrence of the harm."s By 
educating people about both the hazards of their conduct and its 
potential liability consequences, tort law admonishes would-be 
wrongdoers, and thus induces at least some of them to take greater 
care. In this way, liability rules serve a prophylactic, as well as a 
compensatory, purpose. 
This Comment defends Kubert v. Best, and remote texter liability 
more generally, as a valuable instrument of public education about a 
novel and serious public safety problem, and as an appropriate 
example of judicial innovation.9 Part II provides a factual and legal 
overview of Kubert v. Best. lO Part III then analyzes the legal 
concepts at issue: evolving the common law, aligning moral 
culpability with legal responsibility, and preventing foreseeable 
harm. I I 
The Comment further seeks to show that Kubert exemplifies 
appropriate judicial innovation. 12 Part IV promotes Kubert-style 
liability as a desirable means of raising public consciousness and 
suggests that many jurisdictions will adopt this extension of 
Driver Magazine partnered to test brake time reaction for drivers in various 
conditions. Driving 70 mph, an unimpaired driver takes .54 seconds to brake, a 
legally drunk (.08 HAC) driver takes an additional 4 feet, a driver reading an email 
takes an additional 36 feet, and a driver sending a text takes an additional 70 feet. Id. 
8. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
9. See discussion infra Parts II-V. 
10. See discussion infra Part II. 
11. See discussion infra Part III. 
12. See discussion infra Parts IV-V. 
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liability. 13 Part V addresses objections, and then argues that the 
enormous benefit of societal education outweighs the minute added 
liability. 14 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF KUBERT V 
BEST 
A. Factual Background 
On the afternoon of September 21, 2009, David and Linda Kubert 
were riding their motorcycle in Mine Hill Township, New Jersey.IS 
As the Kuberts were rounding a bend, "a pick-up truck ... driven ... 
by eighteen-year-old Kyle Best crossed the double center line" into 
the Kubert's lane of trave1. 16 After an unsuccessful attempt to evade 
the collision, the truck and motorcycled collided.17 David's left leg 
was nearly severed and Linda's left leg was shattered, "leaving her 
fractured thighbone protruding [ from her] skin" as the Kuberts laid 
injured in the road. 18 Best, a volunteer fireman, did his best to aid the 
Kuberts until medical responders arrived, but both victims lost their 
left leg as a result of the accident. 19 
The Kuberts' attorney gathered evidence of Best's cell phone 
activity on the day of the accident, which showed 62 texts between 
Best and his 17-year-old friend, Shannon Colonna, on the day of the 
accident. 20 Colonna texted Best at 5 :48: 14 p.m., Best responded at 
5:48:23 p.m. and 5:48:58 p.m., then Colonna texted back at 5:49:07 
p.m., just before Best placed the 911 call at 5:49: 15 p.m.21 Seventeen 
seconds passed between Best texting Colonna and the 911 call; those 
seventeen seconds had to include Best stopping his truck, getting out, 
seeing the gravity of the injuries, and calling 911.22 The judge 
inferred that the teenagers' texting distracted Best, causing him to 
collide with the Kuberts' motorcycle.23 
13. See discussion infra Part IV. 
14. See discussion infra Part V. 
15. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
16. ld. 
17. ld. at 504. 
18. ld. 
19. ld. 
20. ld. 
21. ld. at 1220 (admitting into evidence a chart indicating the exact times of each text). 
22. ld. 
23. See id. at 1220-21. Cell phone records show that Best resumed texting with Colonna 
at 5:55:30 p.m., and that Best texted Colonna after he began driving home. Id. at 
1221. 
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B. Procedural Posture and Holdings 
The Kuberts brought claims for compensation against both Best 
and Colonna, alleging the accident was caused by distractions created 
by the texters; Best settled and the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Colonna, on the ground that she had no legal 
duty to avoid texting Best, even if she knew he was driving.24 On 
appeal, the Kuberts challenged the dismissal of claims against 
Colonna, urging that if a jury found her texting to be a proximate 
cause of the accident, then she should be liable for aiding and 
abetting Best's unlawful texting while driving.25 The Kuberts further 
asserted that Colonna "had an independent duty to avoid texting to a 
person who [she knew] was driving" and that, based on the 
timestamps of the texts, a jury could infer that Colonna knew Best 
was driving home from work when she texted him less than a minute 
before the accident. 26 
The appellate court agreed that Colonna did have a legal duty to not 
distract Best while he was driving, declaring that "a person sending 
text messages has a duty not to text someone who is driving if the 
. texter knows, or has special reason to know, the recipient will view 
the text while driving.'>27 Nonetheless, the Kuberts were unable to 
produce sufficient evidence to prove that Colonna knew or had 
special reason to know that Best was driving during their text 
conversation; therefore, the appellate court affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of Colonna.28 
C. The Kubert Court's Journey To Defining The Duty Owed By A 
Remote Texter 
To recover for negligence, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant 
breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, and that the breach 
caused actual compensatory injuries to the plaintiff.29 
In analyzing whether a remote texter owes a duty of care to those 
who may be harmed when the text recipient-driver is distracted, the 
New Jersey Superior Court examined case law, including analogous 
precedent from various jurisdictions, and the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts.30 There is a long-standing duty to not interfere with a 
24. Id.atI218,1221. 
25. Id. at 1221. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 emt. b (2010). 
30. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1222-27. 
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driver's operation of the motor vehicle.3l Passengers who actively 
encourage unsafe actions by a driver may be jointly liable for 
resulting harm,32 while mere presence in a negligent driver's vehicle 
or failure to prevent unsafe conduct is, in most jurisdictions, 
insufficient to establish that a passenger aided and abetted the 
driver's negligence.33 Generally, to establish a duty upon passengers, 
they must satisfy either of two conditions. First, the plaintiff could 
establish that the passenger had a special relationship with the driver 
or the passenger actively encouraged the driver's negligent conduct.34 
A special relationship involves an element of control, such as parent-
child, common carrier-passenger, employer-employee, or landowner-
invitee.35 Second, the plaintiff can prove that the passenger actively 
encouraged the driver's negligent conduct. Active encouragement 
entails affirmative acts on the part of the passenger, thus creating a 
situation where a passenger could aid and abet the driver's negligent 
actions.36 
The Kubert holding endorsed these conditions as separate avenues 
for imposing liability on the remote texter and acknowledged that 
Colonna satisfied neither: Colonna did not have a special relationship 
with Best nor did she actively encourage Best to text while driving.37 
With the contents of the text messages unknown to the court, it could 
not be shown that Colonna knew Best was driving, therefore a jury 
could not find that Colonna aided and abetted. 38 The court provided 
31. 8 AM. JUR. 2d Automobiles § 703 (2014). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 876 cmt. a(2) (1979) (stating that two speeding drivers are both liable to an 
injured party). 
32. E.g., Sloan v. Fauque, 784 P.2d 895, 895 (Mont. 1989) (encouraging driver to 
continue chase of another vehicle); Aebischer v. Reidt, 704 P.2d 531, 532 (Or. 1985) 
(refilling marijuana pipe for driver warranted imposing liability on that passenger); 
Hood v. Evans, 126 S.E.2d 898,899-90 (Ga. 1962) (holding liable the passenger who 
signaled the start of a drag race). 
33. E.g., Edwardson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 589 N.W.2d 436, 439-40 (Wisc. Ct. 
App.1998). 
34. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1224 (citing Champion ex reI. Ezzo v. Dunfee, 939 A.2d 825, 829 
-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)). But see Adams v. Morris, 584 S.W.2d 712, 
716-17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding that passengers may owe a common law duty 
of reasonable care to all others on the roadway). 
35. Webb v. Univ. of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 909 (Utah 2005). 
36. See Beth Holliday, Cause of Action Against Motor Vehicle Passenger to Recover for 
Injury Sustained in Accident, 61 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 1, § 3 Alternative Actions 
(2014). 
37. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1224. In this case, it was not argued that Colonna had a special 
relationship with Best-the only condition at issue was active encouragement. Id. 
38. Id. at 1229. 
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that, even under the assumption that Colonna's texts were phrased to 
require responses, the act of sending text messages does not, by itself, 
constitute active encouragement of texting while driving.39 Colonna 
could not actively encourage Best to text while driving if she did not 
know Best was driving.40 
The Kubert court consciously defined the duty owed by a remote 
texter as a narrow one. It recognized that "courts must be careful not 
to 'create a broadly worded duty and . . . run the risk of 
unintentionally imposing liability in situations far beyond the 
parameters we now face. ",41 It therefore limited a text sender's duty 
to circumstances in which the sender knows or has special reason to 
know that the recipient: (1) is driving; and (2) will read and respond 
to the message.42 
III. DOCTRINAL GROUNDINGS OF THE KUBERT HOLDING 
The Kubert court expressed dire concern about the lack of public 
consciousness regarding the deadly epidemic of texting while 
driving. 43 In an effort to promote public awareness of the gravity of 
potential harm, the court appropriately exercised its authority to 
create civil liability where statutes had proven ineffective. The 
Kubert court interpreted the negligence elements of duty and 
proximate cause to support a legal responsibility for risks that people 
know or should know they are creating.44 Because duty and 
proximate cause operate in all common law states as the primary 
doctrinal impediments to third-party liability for negligent driving, 
the Kubert analysis has nationwide implications.45 
A. Statutory Influence, Or Lack Thereof 
Courts have traditionally had authority to decide issues of first 
impression in the absence of a controlling statute.46 Such judge-made 
law creates a binding rule or standard that is then incorporated into 
39. Id. 
40. [d. at 1224. 
41. [d. at 1227 (quoting Estate of Desir ex rei. Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1258 
(2013)). 
42. [d. at 1218-19. 
43. [d. at 1229. 
44. [d. at 1226-28. 
45. Peggy Wright, Text Sender Could Be Civilly Liable for N.J. Wreck, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 29, 2013, 1 :31 PM), http://www.usatoday.comlstory/news/nationl2013/08/29/ 
texting-driving-crash-ru1ing-njl2727549lhtm. 
46. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 376 (1982). 
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the governing body of law.47 "If civil liability is appropriate to 
effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not denied this 
traditional remedy because it is not specifically authorized [by 
statute]. ,,48 
Prior to this case, New Jersey had one statute in place, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. 39:4-97.3, prohibiting texting while driving. This law makes it 
illegal to use a cell phone that is not hands-free while operating a 
motor vehicle, except in a few specifically described emergency 
instances.49 Interestingly, effective July 1, 2014, 50 percent of the 
fines imposed on those who violate this statute are allocated to the 
State, and shall be used for public education, including "infonning 
motorists of the dangers of texting while driving.,,50 Furthermore, in 
response to Kubert, New Jersey amended its criminal assault statute 
in 2012 to add N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:12-1(c)(1), dubbed the "Kulesh, 
Kubert, and Bolis Law.,,51 This new law provides criminal penalties 
for those who use a cell phone while driving and injure others. 52 
47. See id. 
48. Id. 
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:4-97.3 (West Supp. 2014) (amended July I, 2014) states in 
pertinent part: 
a. The use of a wireless telephone or electronic communication 
device by an operator of a moving motor vehicle on a public road 
or highway shall be unlawful except when the telephone is a 
hands-free wireless telephone or the electronic communication 
device is used hands-free .... 
h. The operator of a motor vehicle may use a hand-held wireless 
telephone while driving with one hand on the steering wheel only 
if: 
(I) The operator has reason to fear for his life or safety, or 
believes that a criminal act may be perpetrated against 
himself or another person; or 
(2) The operator is using the telephone to report to 
appropriate authorities a fire, a traffic accident, a serious 
road hazard or medical or hazardous materials emergency, 
or to report the operator of another motor vehicle who is 
driving in a reckless, careless or otherwise unsafe manner 
or who appears to be driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs. 
50. N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:4-97.3(f) (West Supp. 2014). Prior to July I, 2014, the statute 
provided only that the State "shall develop and undertake a program to notify and 
inform the public as to the provisions of this act." The amended statute allocates the 
other 50 percent of fines to the municipality in which the offense occurred. Id. 
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-I(c)(I) (West Supp. 2014); see also Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 
1214, 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:12-I(c)(I) states in pertinent part: 
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B. Creating A Common Law Duty 
The duty element serves as a gatekeeper and must be established to 
succeed on a negligence claim.53 By defining the obligation that one 
person owes another, duty "constrains and channels behavior in a 
socially responsible way before the fact, and it provides a basis for 
jUdging the propriety of behavior thereafter.,,54 Determining the 
scope of duty in negligence claims has long been a judiciary 
function. 55 
The court considers whether a plaintiffs interests deserve legal 
protection from a defendant's conduct.56 In doing so, courts use duty 
to balance competing interests: the security of the class of potential 
victims versus the freedom of action of the class of actors.57 When 
the actor's chosen conduct creates a risk of harm to others, the court 
may determine the appropriateness of the conduct by weighing the 
importance of the actor's goal against the risk of harm such an act 
imposes on others.58 Under Kubert, a person who texts a driver 
knowing that the driver will be distracted by the text effectively 
chose to create risk to the recipient and others on the road. 59 The 
remote texter's decision to text the driver is deemed inappropriate 
because the texter's interest in communicating a message to the 
driver will almost always be outweighed by the increased likelihood 
of an auto accident.60 For example, the texter's desire to ask the 
A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel when the person 
drives a vehicle or vessel recklessly and causes either serious 
bodily injury or bodily injury to another. Assault by auto or vessel 
is a crime of the fourth degree if serious bodily injury results and 
is a disorderly persons offense if bodily injury results. Proof that 
the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while 
driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L. 2003, c. 
310 (C. 39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the 
defendant was driving recklessly. 
53. David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1671, 1674 
(2007). 
54. ld. at 1674-75 (citing David G. Owen, Duty Rules, 54 VAND. L. REv. 767, 767-79 
(2001)). 
55. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (N.J. 1984). 
56. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1227-28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (citing J.S. v. 
R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 928 (N.J. 1998)). 
57. Owen, supra note 53, at 1675. 
58. See id. at 1678. 
59. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227-29. 
60. See id. at 1222-23. 
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driver what s/he wants for dinner does not warrant tripling the risk of 
a car accident.61 
Courts have authority to establish a common law duty of care,62 and 
typically define that duty with reference to notions of basic fairness 
and consideration of public policy.63 Courts weigh the relationship of 
the parties, the associated risk, the opportunity and ability to use care, 
and the public interest in the outcome, with the goal of developing a 
"generally applicable rules to govern societal behaviors.,,64 This is a 
judicial undertaking that looks well beyond the particular facts and 
parties before the court that day.65 
C. Proximate Cause As A Judicial Tool, Not A Bright-Line Rule 
The element of proximate cause is similarly informed by public 
policy.66 "[P]roximate cause is an 'elusive butterfly' that e'er evades 
a net of rules.,,67 Cause-in-fact addresses the factual connection 
between the breach of duty and the injury, whereas proximate cause 
speaks to "whether in logic, fairness, policy, and practicality, the 
defendant ought to be held legally accountable for the plaintiff's 
harm that in some manner is 'remote' from the defendant's breach.,,68 
This element of negligence, though essential for liability,69 cannot be 
boiled down to hard set of rules, let alone a single name; 70 rather, 
61. See generally New VITI Study Results Continue to Highlight the Dangers of 
Distracted Driving, supra note 6 (examining statistical data on the risks associated 
with cell phone use while driving). 
62. See, e.g., Wilson v. Copen, 244 F.3d 178,181 n.1 (ist Cir. 2001). 
63. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1223 (citing Estate of Desir ex. reI. Estiveme v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 
1247,1258 (N.J. 2013)). 
64. See id. (quoting Vertus, 69 A.3d at 1258). 
65. See id. (quoting Vertus, 69 A.3d at 1258). 
66. Ashley Cnty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Proximate 
cause is bottomed on public policy as a limitation on how far society is willing to 
extend liability for a defendant's actions."). 
67. KEETON, ET AL., supra note 8, § 41, at 264 (explaining that proximate cause reflects 
"ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible and 
convenient"); Owen, supra note 53, at 1682. 
68. Owen, supra note 53, at 1681. 
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cmt. b at 79-80 
(2010). 
70. At times, courts refer to proximate cause as "legal cause," yet also reference 
proximate cause as encompassing both factual and legal causation, thereby creating 
mounds of confusion. Owen, supra note 53, at 1682. To assuage this confusion and 
to better exemplify its meaning, the Restatement (Third) of Torts replaces "proximate 
cause" with "scope of liability." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 6 at 492, Special Note on Proximate Cause. 
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proximate cause is a judicial tool used to define the scope of potential 
liability.71 Founded in the concept of foreseeability, proximate cause 
analysis allows a court to examine specific factual and legal issues 
from comprehensive policy and common-sense perspective.72 The 
relevant inquiry is whether, at the time the choice of action was 
made, the actor should have contemglated the class of resulting injury 
as a plausible result of their action. "[P]rior incidents or other facts 
evidencing risks may make certain risks foreseeable that otherwise 
were not, thereby changing the scope-of-liability analysis.,,74 
D. Proximate Cause Satisfied Through Public Policy And Common 
Sense 
As the Kubert court explained, the sender of a text may reasonably 
"assume that the recipient will read a text message only when it is 
safe and legal to do so, that is, when not operating a vehicle.'>7S 
"However, if the sender knows that the recipient is both driving and 
will read the text immediately, then the sender has taken a 
foreseeable risk in sending a text at that time.,,76 Fairness to the 
public requires that the sender be held responsible for such scienter. 
In its proactive expansion of liability, the Kubert court 
appropriately honored the duty and proximate cause doctrines in 
order to develop the common law in response to social and 
technological change. 
IV. REMOTE TEXTER LIABILITY TO RAISE PUBLIC 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
Kubert-style liability may serve as public education when other 
means fail to adequately address a pressing issue. The legal 
landscape is perpetually adjusting to the speed of technological 
innovation and the omnipresence of technology in our daily lives. 77 
From the industrial era to the modem digital age, courts have 
71. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). 
72. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (quoting 
Estate of Desir ex. reI. Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247, 1258 (N.l. 2013)). 
73. Owen, supra note 53, at 1683. 
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 
29 emt. d. 
75. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227. 
76. Id. 
77. See John G. Browning, Emerging Technology and Its Impact on Automotive 
Litigation, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 83, 83-84 (2014). 
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wrestled to adapt time-honored doctrines to our ever-developing 
world. 78 
A. Pervasive Disjunction Between Awareness And Conduct 
Automotive litigation demonstrates the misaligned relationship 
between new technology and established legal concepts.79 The ability 
to instantly communicate with others has bred an electronic tethering 
to one's friends, family, and work; 14,100,000,000 texts are sent per 
day in the United States80 and at any given moment, 660,000 drivers 
are using cell phones and electronic devices while driving.81 Studies 
show that distracted driving, which enhances the risk of a car 
accident by three times,82 is more dangerous than drinking and 
driving.83 
The U.S. Department of Transportation analyzes three main types 
of distraction: manual, visual, and cognitive.84 Texting while driving 
engages all three types simultaneously, making it the most dangerous 
of distractions.8s In 2012, about 421,000 people were injured in 
motor vehicle crashes involving a distracted driver.86 
There is a troubling disjuncture between the perceived threat to 
public safety and the actual actions taken toward curbing the threat. 
Accidents are the fifth leading cause of death in the United States.87 
The majority of Americans believe that distracted driving is a bigger 
problem today than three years ago; the same sample group did not 
78. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1920) (evaluating cases of 
first impression regarding duties in the railroad context); Bridge Proprietors v. 
Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. 116, 147 (1863) (describing the invention of the steam engine 
as a massive difficulty for the legal system); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 
N.E. 99, 100-01 (N.Y. 1928) (discussing the development of the concept of 
foreseeability and its impact on negligence law). 
79. Browning, supra note 77, at 83. 
80. See Text Message Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (June 18, 2013), 
http;llstatisticbrain.comltext-message-statistics/ (showing that from June 2011 to June 
2012, the average number of texts sent per month in the United States was 
423,000,000,000). 
81. What is Distracted Driving?, DISTRACTION.GOV, http;llwww.distraction.gov/stats-
research-Iaws/facts-and-statistics.html (last visited Apr. 10,2015). 
82. ld. 
83. See LeBeau, supra note 7. 
84. What is Distracted Driving?, supra note 81. 
85. ld. 
86. ld. 
87. The Editors of Publ'ns Int'!, 15 Most Common Causes of Death in the United States, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS, http;//health.howstuffworks.comldiseases-conditions/death-dying! 
15-most-common-causes-of-death-in-the-united-states.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
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feel that impaired driving, traffic congestion, and aggressive driving 
posed a similarly growing threat. 88 
On the other hand, polls suggest that the current traffic safety 
culture is one of indifference, founded upon drivers' "do as I say, not 
as I do" attitude.89 Nearly all drivers view texting while driving as 
completely unacceptable, and seven out of eight drivers do perceive 
social disapproval for texting while driving.90 Yet two out of three 
people report using their cell phone "while driving within the past 
month;,,91 one in four people admit to sending a text while driving in 
the past month; and one in three admit to reading a text while driving 
in the past month.92 Further, about "1 in 3 Americans have had a 
friend or relative seriously injured or killed in a [car] crash.,,93 In 
spite of the public's evident awareness of the problem, however, "less 
than half (44.6%) [of drivers] support an outright ban on using any 
type of cell phone (including hands-free) while driving.,,94 These 
statistics are not reserved for the teen population, as many may 
suspect. Rather, adult drivers reported using their phones or texting 
while driving substantially more often than high school-aged teens.95 
Statistics confirm the indifference that is readily apparent in our 
daily lives: people shamelessly admit to using their cell phones while 
driving, despite awareness of the rampant danger. As a mechanism 
for moving the public consciousness, the New Jersey Superior Court 
proactively expanded the existing statutory liability to include remote 
senders of text messages, i.e., those who aid and abet texting while 
driving. 96 
88. See 2013 Traffic Safety Culture Index, AAA FOUND. FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY 14 (Jan. 
2014), https:llwww .aaafoundation.org/sitesl defaultifiles/TSCI%2020 13 %20Final%20 
FTS%20Fonnat.pdf. 
89. Hamilton et aI., supra note 4, at 4. 
90. 2013 Traffic Safety Culture Index, supra note 88, at 3. ("Nearly all drivers view 
texting or emailing while driving as a very serious threat to their own personal safety . 
. . . "). 
91. Teens Report Texting or Using Phone While Driving Significantly Less Often Than 
Adults, AAA NEwsRoOM (Dec 11, 2013), http://newsroom.aaa.coml2013112/teens-
report-texting-or-using-phone-while-driving-significantIy-1ess-often-than-adults/. 
92. Hamilton et aI., supra note 4, at 3. 
93. 2013 Traffic Safety Culture Index, supra note 88, at 3. 
94. Id. 
95. Teens Report Texting, supra note 91 (finding that "[fJorty-three percent of adults ages 
25-39" reported using their phone "fairly often or regularly while driving, compared 
to only 20 percent of teens"). 
96. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
2015 Remote Texter Liability 481 
B. Courts Can Play A Pivotal Role In Raising Awareness 
While legislatures throughout the nation have been enacting civil 
and criminal statutes to address specific modes of distracted driving, 
such lawmaking tends to lag behind the technology it seeks to 
regulate. 97 Most communication takes place through digital 
messaging, be it text or email, rather than actual conversation. 
Therefore, while effective in their narrow scope, the laws already in 
place are not sufficient to combat the epidemic of distracted driving, 
especially texting while driving. 
The Kubert holding reflects the actual dangers of texting while 
driving. Derived from criminal statutes imposing liability on texters 
who cause injury, the Kubert court echoed the legislature'S view that 
texting while driving is more than just negligent; rather, it is 
reckless-a higher degree of subjective culpability.98 
C. Kubert-Style Liability: Coming Soon To A Jurisdiction Near You 
Courts are well positioned to extend or reinterpret existing rules or 
craft new law in response to new and emerging issues. Ideally, they 
will adopt common law liability rules in dialogue with the legislature. 
1. Legislative Support For Judicial Extension 
The Kubert court relied on existing state statutes and the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts to justify their extension of liability.99 
Presently, 44 states and the District of Columbia have bans on texting 
while driving. lOo Most of these are primary laws-i.e., police may 
stop a motorist for that offense alone. lOl Notwithstanding the national 
trend toward enacting such prohibitions, there is a parallel trend of 
not enforcing them. 102 States issue, on average, one ticket per day for 
97. See generally id. at 1218-19 (explaining that the distracted driving laws enacted thus 
far by the legislature do not answer the issue presented in this case "whether one who 
is texting from a location remote from the driver of a motor vehicle can be liable to 
persons injured because the driver was distracted by the text"). 
98. See id. at 1229. 
99. Id. at 1222-27. 
100. Distracted Driving: Cel/phones and Texting, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY (Mar. 
20 IS), http://www . iihs.orgliihs/topics/laws/cellphonelaws?topicN ame=distracted-
driving (providing a table of state-by-state laws restricting cellphone use and texting, 
including enforcement mechanisms). 
101. Larry Copeland, FWIW. Few Drivers Nabbed by Texting Bans, USA TODAY (May S, 
2013, 3 :39 PM), http://www.usatoday.comlstory/news/nationl20 13/0SIOSltexting-
driving-bans-enforcement-tickets/213381S/html. 
102. Id. 
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violating cell phone laws. 103 Justin McNaull, director of state 
relations for AAA and fonner Virginia police officer, defended such 
under-enforcement on the ground that it takes time for police to 
establish and propagate effective enforcement tactics. 104 McNaull 
further explained that it is easier to issue citations for speeding or 
failing to buckle a seatbelt, as those violations are readily apparent, 
whereas a driver using a small cell phone is hard to SpOt. 105 McNaull 
concluded: "Ultimately, the goal of traffic laws and traffic 
enforcement isn't to write a certain number of tickets. It's to change 
behavior. It's to discourage people from engaging in dangerous 
behavior." 106 
2. Elastic Common Law Doctrines Facilitate Change 
Duty exists where a court declares it does; as our ideas of 
responsibility change with the times, so do the duties imposed by 
courts. 107 Recently, courts have imposed new duties in response to 
pervasive dangers that are foreseeable. 108 Virtually all jurisdictions 
p'resently employ a foreseeability (or risk) standard for judging 
proximate cause. 109 This standard has been the basis for imposing 
civil liability for other serious but preventable threats to public 
safety. 110 
Although the specific duty announced in Kubert is novel, the 
Kubert court in fact joined the broad trend in recent decades of using 
the common law to incentivize or induce safer, more responsible 
behavior. 111 For example, most jurisdictions now impose dram shop 
liability, which recognizes a duty of care for a restaurant or bar that 
continues to serve an obviously drunk patron who will later drive. 112 
Today, dram shop laws are mostly codified, but the initial impetus for 
recognizing such a duty came from the courts. 113 Dram shop liability 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. See Ontiveros v. Borak, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (Ariz. 1983) (en bane). 
108. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 
29 emt. e (2010); Owen, supra note 53, at 1685. 
109. Id. 
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 29 emt. e. 
111. See Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1224-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
112. Ross Sharkey, Note, Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC: Is It Time To Revise Montana's 
Dram Shop Act?, 72 MONT. L. REv. 127, 129-30 (2011). 
113. Ontiveros v. Bank, 667 P.2d 200, 209 (Ariz. 1983) (en bane) ("These holdings have 
been translated into a finding of duty in common law .... "). 
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extends a tavern owners' duty to protect patrons from other violent 
patrons to a duty to protect the general public by ceasing to furnish 
alcohol to an intoxicated patron. 114 Courts have compared reckless 
over-serving of alcohol with a "put [ting] into the hands of an 
obviously demented individual a firearm with which he shot an 
innocent third person.,,115 Just as providing an insane person with a 
firearm, or continuing to serve alcohol to a patron who is likely to 
drive, irresponsibility enhances the risk of harm, so, too, does 
willfully inducing a driver to text while driving. 116 
Building on these established duties, scholars are proposing new 
ways in which judicial initiative may serve to mitigate (or solve) 
novel and seemingly incurable problems. For instance, Kubert-style 
liability may be the next step in attacking the hot-button issue of 
cyberbullying. Law Professor Elizabeth Jaffe, a national expert on 
the legal response to bullying,117 advocates for expanding duty to 
include webservers and web hosts-e.g., Facebook or Twitter-who 
are in a position to proactively monitor their websites and cut off 
sources of cyberbullying.118 Like the Kubert court, Jaffe purports to 
turn a moral duty into a legal duty, thereby imposing liability on 
those in control of reasonably foreseeable harm. 119 Embracing the 
message in Kubert, Jaffe believes that the threat of civil liability will 
incentivize web hosts to take affirmative steps to prevent harm from 
occurring. 120 
Using the law to effect social change is unique neither to 
legislatures, nor to courts. Situations of aiding and abetting 
dangerous behavior are appropriately combatted through judicially-
imposed law, just as was the case in Kubert. 
114. Id. at 211. 
115. Id. at 209 (citing Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 198 A.2d 550,553 
(Pa. 1964». 
116. Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1229; LeBeau, supra note 7; see also Colo. Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. 
City & Cnty. of Denver, 820 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (holding as 
constitutional an ordinance banning pit bulls); Tracey v. Solesky, 50 A.3d 1075 (Md. 
2012) (imposing strict liability on landlords of pit bull-owning tenants based on 
inherent danger involved in a pit bull attack, thereby implying a moral duty not to aid 
and abet the existence of pit bulls in domestic environments), superseded by statute, 
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-1901 (2014). 
117. See Elizabeth M Jaffe Faculty Biography, JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL, 
http://www.johnmarshall.edulfacultystafflelizabeth-m-jaffe/ (last visited Jan. 17, 
2015). 
118. Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Imposing a Duty in an Online World: Holding the Webhost Liable 
for Cyberbul/ying, 35 HASTINGS COMM. &ENT. L.J. 277,297 (2013). 
119. Id. at 300--02. 
120. Id. at 299. 
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V. OBJECTIONS TO REMOTE TEXTER LIABILITY ARE 
UNWARRANTED, AS IT PROVIDES EDUCATIONAL 
BENEFIT IN EXCHANGE FOR LITTLE ADDED LIABILITY 
On its face, Kubert may appear to threaten an exponential 
expansion of liability for the simple act of sending a text message, an 
action that occurs 14,100,000,000 times per day in the United 
States. 121 However, such a fear is unwarranted. Kubert will not and 
was not intended to result in significantly more liability. With very 
few exceptions, the rule of Kubert does not apply to the wife who 
texts her husband a grocery list to be viewed at the store later, or the 
teenage boy who texts his girlfriend saying "Good luck on your test 
today." Rather, Kubert aims to send a message (no pun intended) to 
the general public: Texting is dangerous and kills people at a rate 
comparable to drunk driving,122 so stop texting and driving! 
A. This Analysis Is Not Subject To The Superseding Cause Doctrine 
A common objection to Kubert's expansion of liability is that the 
recipient of the text, as the ultimate decision maker, should retain 
sole liability for diverting their focus from the road to their phone.123 
Critics of Kubert argue that, even if texting a driver sometimes is 
irresponsible, in the sense that the texter understands that slbe is 
creating a risk of harm, the driver's decision to read and respond to 
the text is the superseding cause of any accident, thus cutting off the 
remote texter's chain of foreseeability. 124 This argument, though, is 
incompatible with the purpose of the proximate cause element and is 
also accounted for in the Kubert test. 
First, the United States Supreme Court has expressly carved out 
instances in which the closest temporal action to the harm is the sole 
proximate cause. 125 A superseding cause exempts prior negligent 
actions from liability because the "injury was actually brought about 
by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.,,126 
These intervening events sever the chain of causation, thus rendering 
the prior cause remote. 127 "An intervening act may not be deemed a 
121. See Text Message Statistics, supra note 80. 
122. Wheeler v. Hruza, No. CIV 08-4087,2010 WL 2231959, at *3 (D.S.D. June 2, 2010) 
("[R]ecent studies have shown that the probability of a vehicular collision is as great 
for intoxicated drivers as for texting and cell phone use drivers."). 
123. See Eugene Volokh, Liability for Texting Driver, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 30, 
2013, 12:38 PM), http://www.volokh.coml20 13/08/30/liability-texting-driver/. 
124. ld. 
125. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S.Ct.1l86, 1192(2011). 
126. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 (1996). 
127. Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314, 326-27 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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superseding cause, however, if the intervening act was set in motion 
by the initial act of negligence.,,128 Key to the analysis is the 
independence of the final actor. 129 In the circumstance of texting, the 
actions are concerted, not independent. 130 Therefore, the superseding 
cause doctrine does not serve as legal insulation for the remote texter. 
B. Slippery Slope Is Not So Slippery 
Kubert should not be read to suggest that one cannot distribute any 
form of message to someone who is traveling without being 
negligent. Most smartphones l31 notify receipt not only of text 
messages, but also Facebook messages, Twitter replies, Snapchat 
images, email, and voicemail messages. 132 Often, all message 
notifications appear in the same or similar format, thereby creating 
the same or similar level of distraction and foreseeable risk of hann 
to others. The fact that a text message may be indistinguishable from 
many other equally distracting message notifications naturally raises 
the question of whether the Kubert rule can be limited to text 
messagmg. 
Although the Kubert court intended to expose only a narrow class 
of texters to potential liability, this initial intention is no guarantee 
that the scope will remain so confined. One might worry that future 
courts, in their enthusiasm to effect social change through extension 
of traditional tort law, could extend the logic of Kubert to a broader 
category of remote texters, thus opening the floodgates for 
litigation. 133 
However, limits on liability for people who distract drivers are 
already well established. Drivers are exposed to a miscellany of 
distractions as they travel: stadium events, billboards, road signs, 
128. Fletcher v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 406 F. App'x 785, 790 (4th Cir. 2011). 
129. Id. at 790-91 (finding the sole proximate cause, despite the Pizza Hut employee's 
negligent parking of car in traffic lane, to be another driver's decision to move around 
the delivery car and run a red light); Hubbard v. Murray, 3 S.E.2d 397, 401-02 (Va. 
1939) (finding independence of actions where, despite the bus driver's negligent 
parking of the bus on the highway, the truck driver could have stopped his vehicle to 
avoid the collision). 
130. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1224 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
131. "Smartphone" also includes tablets, PDAs, Blackberrys, and other text-enabled 
communication devices. 
132. See Dennis O'Reilly, How to Silence Notifications on Smartphones and Tablets, 
CNET (Nov. 19,2012,4:47 PM), http://howto.cnet.comJ8301-11310_39-57551600-
285/how-to-silence-notifications-on-smartphones-and-tablets/. 
133. Send a Text, Be Liable for a Car Crash, AMERICA'S FuTuRE, http://www.americasfuture.netl 
courtmonitor/2013/2013-11-1O.html (last visited Feb. 3,2015). 
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low-flying aircraft, cars stopped in the shoulder, accidents, holiday 
decorations, and conspicuous pedestrians present habitual diversions 
to driving. As discussed by the California Court of Appeals in 1993, 
"[t]ravelers who, in the manner of Homer's ancient Argonauts, must 
sail past Sirens, are obliged to exercise reasonable care in the 
navigation of their craft and resist being seduced by sights and 
sounds.,,134 Drivers have a duty to use reasonable care while 
operating the vehicle, which includes being aware of potential 
dangers and not allowing attractive sights to interfere with their 
careful operation of the vehicle. 135 
Although society accepts many distractions along the road, text 
messaging is unique in both the ways it is used and the nature of the 
distraction it presents. Stadium events, decorations, pedestrians, and 
aircrafts are conducting business-as-usual, which is wholly unrelated 
to the fact that people are simultaneously driving cars in the vicinity. 
Billboards target drivers and passengers in cars, but do so generally, 
as opposed to soliciting the attention of a specific driver. Accidents 
on the road and cars in the shoulders are inevitable. Road signs 
deliver pertinent messages that may require attention. In each of 
these instances of general distraction, the blanket duty of reasonable 
care that the law imposes on drivers is generally sufficient to induce 
them to maintain their focus primarily on the road. In addition, these 
kinds of general distractions tend to be very brief-typically a 
fraction of a second; in contrast, reading and responding to a text 
message requires much more sustained focus. 136 
Texting a driver is different. A principal reason to text, as opposed 
to call, is to deliver an ordinary message that can be viewed later at 
one's convenience and when it is safe and appropriate to do so. 
Further, text messaging has a personal aspect that is absent in the 
above-mentioned distractions: a texter chooses the recipient of the 
text message and directly communicates with that individual. The 
risk-generating conduct involves specific action by two parties. 
Moreover, there is a level of conscious awareness of the danger 
before the action is made. The sender of the text message will 
sometimes be aware of the hazard they are creating for a particular 
driver. The joint culpability is now reflected in Kubert, which makes 
such awareness an essential condition for liability. Lastly, the 
l34. Lompoc Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 128 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
l35. Id. at 125. 
l36. See LeBeau, supra note 7. 
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blanket duty on drivers to avoid temptations to divert their attention 
has proven insufficient when applied to texting while driving. 
Embracing Kubert does not threaten unbounded significant 
expansion of liability; therefore, the societal value of Kubert' s third-
party liability is not undermined by a slippery slope argument. 
C. Kubert Is Compatible With Traditional Tort Liability 
Traditionally, tort liability principally seeks to compensate a 
specific injured party.137 Tort liability has increasingly been used as a 
catalyst for the evolution of public consciousness-a purpose long 
associated with criminallaw. 138 
If I were sitting in the passenger seat of your car, acting in a way 
that I knew would likely distract you as the driver, and you 
consequently got into an accident, both you and I would be liable. 139 
The remote physical location of a sender of a text message who 
nevertheless knowingly distracts a driver should not change the 
analysis. This concept is also embodied in dram shop liability 
laws. 140 
This holding is consistent with traditional negligence liability: 
persons have a duty to act (or not act, as in this case) reasonably 
when their conduct foreseeably creates a risk of harm to others. 141 
This duty does not cease just because the risk is produced through the 
joint conduct of two separate actors. With foundations in traditional 
tort principles, Kubert-style liability is narrowly crafted to outwit 
superseding cause doctrines and slippery slope problems. In the 
absence of any serious objections, remote texter liability brings the 
enormous benefit of societal education for relatively little added 
liability. 
137. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F .3d 111, 169 (2d Cir. 2010). 
138. See Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1973) ("Criminal 
cases may be useful as guides to the type of conduct which the law will condemn or 
excuse .... "). 
139. Adams v. Morris, 584 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding that'a 
passenger who distracted the driver was liable for breaching a standard of ordinary 
care). 
140. Larry Copeland, Horrific Ne. Crash Puts Spotlight on Dram Shop Laws, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 28, 2012, 5:41 PM), http://www.usatoday.com!story/news/2012/11124/ 
dram-shop-laws/1660707 I. 
141. Montgomery v. Nat'l Convoy & Trucking Co., 195 S.E. 247, 250-51 (S.c. 1938). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Delivery of the Kubert message was attempted prior to Kubert, 142 
yet efforts have been in vain. 143 Therefore, in a plea to the general 
public to cease an activity that causes rampant and unnecessary 
deaths, the New Jersey Superior Court crafted a narrow test for 
placing liability on the remote text sender who sends a text message 
to a person who they know is driving, will view the text, and will 
respond. l44 By design, the elements of the Kubert test will rarely be 
met,145 as liability is only imposed on those remote texters with 
knowledge that the recipient is driving and will view the text while 
doing SO.146 Such a narrow test suggests that this holding strives to 
discourage dangerous conduct, rather than rack up case after case of 
tort liability and damages. 
By grounding this prophylactic rule in traditional tort law, Kubert-
style liability may soon become law in many jurisdictions. As the 
Kubert court explained: 
Just as the public has learned the dangers of drinking and 
driving through a sustained campaign and enhanced 
criminal penalties and civil liability, the hazards of texting 
when on the road, or to someone who is on the road, may 
become part of the public consciousness when the liability 
of those involved matches the seriousness of the harm. 147 
Judicial innovation, as exemplified by the Kubert court, should be 
embraced as a valuable tool for curing the disjuncture between public 
awareness and conduct, with little added liability. Such proactive 
expansions of liability can serve as catalysts for raising public 
consciousness of serious societal problems, while evolving the 
common law to align with social and technological changes. 
142. See supra Part V. 
143. See Wheeler v. Hruza, No. elY 08-4087, 2010 WL 2231959, at *3 (D.S.D. June 2, 
2010) (explaining that a lack of public concern for the dangers of drivers using cell 
phones, as compared to concern for intoxicated drivers, impacted its actionability). 
144. Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214,1219 (N.l Super. App. Div. 2013). 
145. The defendant in Kubert was found not liable due to a lack of evidence to satisfy the 
test. Id. at 1224-25. 
146. Id.at1219. 
147. Id. at 1229. 
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